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INTRODUCTION.
The United States has long been known as a bastion of freedom
and a nation that readily opens its arms to those seeking refuge from
persecution. As emblazoned on the Statue of Liberty, “give me your
tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free.” 1 This
premise stems largely from principles considered fundamental to
Americans, i.e. the free exercise of religion, freedom of speech,
freedom of association, among others. Further, it has long been a
practice that the U.S. will not return a foreign national to a country
where that national’s life or freedom is threatened. 2 The U.S.
promotes this policy through the application of its asylum laws. 3 The
1

EMMA LAZARUS, THE NEW COLOSSUS (1883), reprinted in EMMA LAZARUS:
SELECTIONS FROM HER POETRY AND PROSE 48 (Morris Schappes ed. Jewish
Historical Society of New York 1967). The poem was inscribed on the base of the
Statue of Liberty in 1903.
2
Ruth Ellen Wasem, CRS Report for Congress: U.S. Immigration Policy on
Asylum Seekers, May 5, 2005, available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32621.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2006).
3
Asylum is the process by which the United States grants lawful presence to a
refugee fleeing a foreign country due to persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. An alien
who successfully demonstrates that he or she has faced past persecution in a foreign
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United States’ commitment to these principles and its ubiquitous
reputation and stance as the land of the free has long provided
persecuted aliens the opportunity to start life anew.
What is the result then, if the ability of aliens fleeing from
genuine persecution becomes endangered in administrative
blundering, ignorance, incompetence, or perhaps political posturing?
Does this begin to taint our history as an oasis for persecuted refugees?
Or is it necessary to rethink and reform our long held status as a
sanctuary for the persecuted in light of the dangers a relatively open
door policy can pose in the post-9/11 era?
The answers to these questions are complex and may differ
amongst political ideologies, but what remains certain is that there
exists a fundamental problem in the area of immigration adjudication,
and in particular, asylum adjudication. The number of asylum
adjudication cases appealed to the U.S. circuit courts of appeals from
the government agencies charged with adjudicating such cases has
risen sharply in the past several years. 4 In and of itself, a rise in the
number of appeals to the federal courts poses little problem other than
an increased burden on judicial resources. However, the troubling
aspect of these appeals, and a further indication of a fundamental and
underlying problem, is the unusually high rate at which aliens’
petitions to review are granted and federal agencies’ decisions are
thereby reversed. 5 For example, in the period between June 15, 2005
and December 15, 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit granted the alien’s petition for review in
approximately two-thirds (19 of 29) of the published opinions that
country or likely would face future persecution if returned to that country is
protected and immune from extradition to the country from which he or she has fled.
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (2005); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006).
4
U.S. Department of Justice: Executive Office for Immigration Review, BIA
Restructuring and Streamlining Procedures, (Dec. 8, 2004 revised),
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/04/BIAStreamlining120804.pdf (last visited Apr.
26, 2006). “The rate of new petitions — the number of BIA decisions appealed to
the Federal courts compared to the total number of BIA decisions — has increased
from an historical 5 percent (before 2002) to a current [December 8, 2004] level of
approximately 25 percent.” Id.
5
See Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005).
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dealt with asylum denial issues. 6 What is the source of this high rate
of reversal and what can be done to remedy it? How are the Seventh
Circuit and the U.S. Government responding to the problems
identified?
This Comment will explore some of the problems inherent in the
immigration adjudication system identified throughout opinions issued
by the Seventh Circuit between June 15, 2005 and December 15, 2005.
Part I introduces the basics of the asylum adjudication process. Part II
addresses the unusually high rate of reversal seen in recent Seventh
Circuit decisions. Part III explores several of the most common flaws
identified in immigration judge (“IJ”) and Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”) decisions, particularly credibility determinations and
corroboration requirements, and explores potential remedies to these
problems. Part IV discusses several procedural problems created by
federal agencies that have helped contribute to the high rate of
reversals. In addition, this Comment explores the role the Seventh
Circuit is playing in effectuating change in the system of asylum
6

Cases in which the petition was granted: Kllokoqi v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 336
(7th Cir. 2005); Durgac v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 2005); Lhanzom v.
Gonzales, 430 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 2005); Tabaku v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 417 (7th Cir.
2005); Dawoud v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 2005); Ssali v. Gonzales, 424
F.3d 556 (7th Cir. 2005); Tapiero de Orejeula v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 666 (7th Cir.
2005); Galicia v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 2005); Sosnovskaia v. Gonzales,
421 F.3d 589 (7th Cir. 2005); Dong v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 573 (7th Cir. 2005); Hor
v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 2005); Haile v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 493 (7th Cir.
2005); Nakibuka v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 2005); Chen v. Gonzales, 420
F.3d 707 (7th Cir. 2005); Koval v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 798 (7th Cir. 2005); Sahi v.
Gonzales 416 F.3d 587 (7th Cir. 2005); Mohideen v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 567 (7th
Cir. 2005); Soumahoro v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 2005); Fessehaye v.
Gonzales, 414 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 2005)
Cases in which the petition was denied: Djouma v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 685 (7th
Cir. 2005); Hamdan v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 1051 (7th Cir. 2005); Hussain v.
Gonzales, 424 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2005); Firmansjah v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 598 (7th
Cir. 2005); Vasile v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2005) (petition denied on
jurisdictional grounds); Mitreva v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 2005); Singh v.
Gonzales, 417 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2005); Hernandez-Baena v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d
720 (7th Cir. 2005); Li v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2005); Hysi v. Gonzales,
411 F.3d 847 (7th Cir. 2005).
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application adjudications and in the context of immigration
adjudication as a whole.
I.

THE ASYLUM ADJUDICATION PROCESS:BACKGROUND AND
PROCEDURE.
A. A Brief Introduction to the Asylum Process.

Asylum is typically thought of as governmental protection and
immunity from extradition or deportation granted to a political refugee
fleeing from a foreign country. The process of applying for asylum in
the United States, although not overly complicated, can be an arduous
and often frustrating experience for those seeking such protection. In
order to adequately address the issues that are currently contributing to
the high rate of reversal amongst administrative asylum decisions, a
brief overview of the asylum procedure is necessary.
There are several means by which an alien may attempt to gain
lawful status within the United States as an asylee. 7 The context in
which an alien applies for asylum differs depending on that particular
alien’s legal status within the U.S, whether present legally or illegally.
Given this status, the alien will apply through either an agency of the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) known as United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) or through the
7

“An asylum application can arise in three contexts: (1) an affirmative
application, in which a noncitizen in valid nonimmigrant status applies for asylum
with the . . . USCIS; (2) a defensive application filed with an immigration judge (IJ)
in response to action taken against the noncitizen; and (3) in response to expedited
removal proceedings.” 3-34 CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN & STEPHEN
YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 34.02 (2006). If an alien
applies for asylum with the USCIS, an officer of the USCIS shall perform an initial
interview with the alien to determine if the alien has a ‘credible fear’ of persecution.
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii)-(b)(1)(B)(ii) (1996). Should the USCIS determine that
the alien does have a credible fear of persecution, the alien’s asylum application will
be referred to the DOJ immigration court for a hearing on the matter. 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(1)(B). Note also that should the officer determine that there is no ‘credible
fear’ of persecution, an alien is entitled to prompt review by an IJ. 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III).
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Immigration Court of the Executive Office for Immigration Review,
administered by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”). 8 Regardless of
the manner in which asylum is sought, unless an alien’s asylum
application is granted, that application will at some point be
adjudicated in a hearing in front of an immigration judge or IJ. 9 At
this hearing, an IJ “evaluates an alien’s claim for credibility, assessing
internal consistency, plausibility, and detail,”10 and may require the
alien to provide corroborating evidence in certain circumstances. 11
To qualify for asylum, an alien bears the burden of demonstrating
that he or she is a refugee that is unable or unwilling to return to his or
her home country because of past persecution or a well-founded fear
of future persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 12 If an
alien is able to demonstrate past persecution, this gives rise to a
rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. 13
The IJ will either grant or deny asylum and will render a written
decision addressing the merits of the alien’s claim. If asylum is denied
by the IJ, the alien may appeal the decision to the BIA, which serves
as the appellate entity of the Immigration Court. This appellate Board
is made up of eleven members appointed by the Attorney General, 14
although temporary Board members may be added for periods not to
exceed six months. 15
8

See 3-34 CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR,
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 34.02 (2006).
9
Id.
10
Ssali v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 556, 562 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Capric v.
Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1075, 1085 (7th Cir. 2004)).
11
See Lin v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 748, 751 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Uwase v.
Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir. 2003); Georgis v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 962,
969 (7th Cir. 2003). See also 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (2000) (stating “[t]he testimony
of the applicant, if credible, may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof without
corroboration.”)).
12
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (2005); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006).
13
See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1).
14
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1) (2005).
15
Id. at § 1003.1(a)(4).
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Under a ‘streamlining’ regulation enacted in 2002 by former
Attorney General John Ashcroft, 16 a single BIA member is authorized
to affirm an IJ’s decision without issuing an opinion if that Board
member determines that the underlying result was correct, that any
errors in the decision were harmless or nonmaterial, and that either (1)
the issues on appeal are squarely controlled by existing Board or
federal court precedent and do not involve the application of precedent
to a novel factual situation, or (2) the factual and legal issues raised on
appeal are not so substantial that the case warrants the issuance of a
written opinion in the case. 17 If the Board member determines that
one of these two conditions is not met, a three-member Board panel
will then review the application. 18 The Board panel may then reverse
the lower decision and issue an opinion of its own, affirm the decision
without issuing an opinion, or affirm the decision with an amended or
new opinion. 19
B. Judicial Review by the Federal Courts of Appeals.
If the BIA affirms an IJ’s decision with its own opinion or amends
the opinion of the IJ, the alien may appeal the BIA’s decision to the
federal court of appeals having jurisdiction over the alien. 20 A federal
circuit court reviews this decision under the deferential “substantial
16

U.S. Department of Justice: Executive Office for Immigration Review, BIA
Restructuring and Streamlining Procedures, (Dec. 8, 2004 revised), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/04/BIAStreamlining120804.pdf (last visited Apr.
26, 2006).
17
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4)(i). Note also that “[A] decision to streamline does
not mean that the BIA has adopted, or entirely approves of, the IJ’s determinations;
it only means that the BIA deemed any errors by the IJ to be harmless.” Hamdan v.
Gonzales, 425 F.3d 1051, 1058 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft,
350 F.3d 845, 849 (9th Cir. 2003)).
18
See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(6).
19
Id. at § 1003.1(d)-(e).
20
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2005). See also 8-104 CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY
MAILMAN & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE §§
104.05, 104.13 (2006).
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evidence” standard 21 in which the decision “must be affirmed if it is
supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the
record considered as a whole.” 22 Substantial evidence is more than a
“mere scintilla” or “uncorroborated hearsay;” “it means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” 23 Therefore, a court will grant a petition for review only
if the alien appellant “shows that ‘the evidence not only supports
[reversal of the BIA’s decision], but compels it.’” 24 In addition, an
asylum grant is ultimately a discretionary decision by the Attorney
General. 25
If the BIA affirms an IJ’s ruling without opinion, the court
reviews the decision of the IJ directly, 26 again applying the substantial
evidence test, reversing only if the evidence compels a different
result. 27 The IJ’s opinion must be supported by “specific, cogent
reasons . . . [that] bear a legitimate nexus to the finding.” 28
The Seventh Circuit has stated that under this standard, “outright
reversal is almost never called for. More commonly, petitions for
review will be granted when the court concludes that there is more that
21

5 U.S.C. § 706 (1966).
Liu v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 307, 312 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting INS v. EliasZacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992)).
23
Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676, 691 (9th Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949), reh. denied, 339 U.S. 945 (1950) (citing Consolidated
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229-30 (1838)).
24
Liu, 380 F.3d at 312 (quoting Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481 n.1).
25
Asylum applications sometimes are denied in the exercise of discretion, even
if the alien has established a well-founded fear of persecution on account of one of
the five statutory grounds. 3-33 CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN & STEPHEN
YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 33.05 (2006).
26
Durgac v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 849, 851 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Soumahoro
v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2005); Lin v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 748, 751
(7th Cir. 2004).
27
Durgac, 430 F.3d at 851; see also Mitreva v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 761, 764
(7th Cir. 2005); Balogun v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 2004).
28
Ahmad v. INS, 163 F.3d 457, 461 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting Nasseri v.
Moschorak, 34 F.3d 723, 726 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Fisher
v. INS, 79 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 1996)).
22
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must be done at the agency level before final conclusion on an asylum
application is possible.” 29 Thus, although an “IJ’s credibility
determination is entitled to great deference,”30 a court “will not
automatically yield to the IJ’s conclusions when they are drawn from
insufficient or incomplete evidence.” 31 As will be shown,
insufficiently supported adverse credibility determinations represent a
major source of errors identified in asylum decisions reviewed by the
Seventh Circuit.
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT:
REVERSE, REVERSE, REVERSE.
Given the deferential substantial evidence standard of review
applied by the federal courts, one might speculate that the Seventh
Circuit would rarely grant an alien’s petition for review, and would
outright reverse the decision of the IJ or BIA in even fewer
instances. 32 Surprisingly, this assumption is decidedly off base. As
noted previously, during its last term, the Seventh Circuit granted the
alien’s petition for review in approximately two-thirds of its published
opinions concerning asylum. 33 Even more troubling is the fact that
this alarmingly high rate of reversal applies not only to asylum
decisions, but extends to all immigration decisions rendered by
immigration adjudicators. For example, the Seventh Circuit recently
noted:

29

Durgac, 430 F.3d at 851-852.
Dong v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 573, 578 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing see Uwase v.
Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir. 2003)).
31
Dong, 421 F.3d at 578 (citing Georgis v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 962, 968 (7th
Cir. 2003)).
32
The Seventh Circuit has noted that under the substantial deference standard,
credibility determinations “should only be overturned under extraordinary
circumstances.” Ahmad v. INS, 163 F.3d 457, 461 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Nasir v.
INS, 122 F.3d 484, 486 (7th Cir. 1997)).
33 See supra note 6.
30

223
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol1/iss1/12

8

Floss: Seeking Asylum in a Hostile System: The Seventh Circuit Reverses

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 1, Issue 1

Spring 2006

In the year ending [September 23, 2005], different
panels of this court reversed the [BIA] in whole or part
in a staggering 40 percent of the 136 petitions to review
the Board that were resolved on the merits. The
corresponding figure, for the 82 civil cases during this
period in which the United States was the appellee, was
18 percent. 34
However, the high reversal rate alone does not complete the story.
Accompanying these reversals has been scathing critique of the
analyses, methods employed, and conclusions formed by the
underlying immigration adjudicators. A sampling of a recent Seventh
Circuit decision provides but a small snippet of the varying critiques
leveled upon the IJ or BIA:
[o]ur criticisms of the Board and of the immigration
judges have frequently been severe . . . “the
[immigration judge’s] opinion is riddled with
inappropriate and extraneous comments” . . . “this very
significant mistake suggests that the Board was not
aware of the most basic facts of [the petitioner’s] case” .
. . “the procedure that the [immigration judge]
employed in this case is an affront to [petitioner’s] right
to be heard”) . . . the immigration judge’s factual
conclusion is “totally unsupported by the record” . . .
the immigration judge’s unexplained conclusion is
“hard to take seriously” . . . “there is a gaping hole in
the reasoning of the board and the immigration judge” .
. . “the elementary principles of administrative law, the
rules of logic, and common sense seem to have eluded
the Board in this as in other cases.” 35

34
35

Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005).
Id. (citations omitted).
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This type of biting criticism has continued beyond those decisions
of the Seventh Circuit’s past term, thus indicating that the problem is
persistent and fundamentally ingrained in the system. 36 Nor is the
Seventh Circuit alone in rendering harsh criticism upon IJs and the
BIA. In Benslimane v. Gonzales the Court cites language from the
Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits:
[o]ther circuits have been as critical . . . “the tone, the
tenor, the disparagement, and the sarcasm of the
[immigration judge] seem more appropriate to a court
television show than a federal court proceeding” . . . the
immigration judge’s finding is “grounded solely on
speculation and conjecture” . . . the immigration judge’s
“hostile” and “extraordinarily abusive” conduct toward
petitioner “by itself would require a rejection of his
credibility finding” . . . “the [immigration judge’s]
assessment of Petitioner’s credibility was skewed by
prejudgment, personal speculation, bias, and
conjecture” . . . “it is the [immigration judge’s]
conclusion, not [the petitioner’s] testimony, that ‘strains
credulity’”. 37
Obviously the system is flawed and the Seventh Circuit has
chosen to voice its rising indignation on this matter in a manner that
has received growing publicity of late. 38 The criticism seems
36

For example, in Cecaj v. Gonzales the court stated:
The immigration judge’s analysis of the evidence was
radically deficient. He failed to consider the evidence as a whole,
as he was required to do by the elementary principles of
administrative law. [citations omitted] Instead he broke it into
fragments. Suppose you saw someone holding a jar, and you said,
“That’s a nice jar,” and he smashed it to smithereens and said,
“No, it’s not a jar.” That is what the immigration judge did.
440 F.3d 897, 899 (7th Cir. 2006).
37
Benslimane, 430 F.3d at 829.
38
Adam Liptak, Courts Criticize Judges’ Handling of Asylum Cases, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 26, 2005, at A1.
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warranted as well. An adjudicative body that is reversed in nearly
two-thirds of its appeals represents an affront to the rights of those
seeking protection in its courts. This is particularly true given that the
high rate of reversals in the Seventh Circuit has taken place under the
application of the deferential substantial evidence standard of review.
But what is the root cause for this judicial breakdown? And is the
system really as flawed as the Seventh Circuit claims it to be?
III. COMMON ERRORS IN IJ AND BIA ANALYSES.
Despite the sometimes scathing and often pointed critiques by the
Seventh Circuit, the majority of the asylum reversals issued by the
Court in its last term can be attributed to one or both of two issues that
form the crux of nearly every asylum claim analysis; (1) a credibility
assessment of the alien’s testimony as well as any accompanying
evidence presented and, (2) the imposition of a corroborating evidence
requirement on an otherwise credible alien. The immigration
adjudicator must support decisions regarding these issues with
substantial evidence gleaned from the record as a whole. 39 Yet, as
identified by the Seventh Circuit, this is often not the case.
A. Is the Asylum Claim Credible?
During an asylum hearing an immigration judge will assess the
credibility of the alien applicant, as well as the credibility of any
accompanying witnesses, experts, and other evidence. DHS counsel
will cross-examine the applicant, and the IJ may also question the
alien. An interpreter, whether provided by the alien or by the DOJ,
will almost always be present. An IJ will then, based on all the
available evidence, determine whether the alien’s claim of persecution
is credible or incredible. 40 Credibility determinations “must be

39

Millar v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1530, 1540 (D.C.Cir. 1983) (stating that an
agency’s conclusions must be based on record as a whole).
40
See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2005).
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supported by specific, cogent reasons.” 41 In addition, any reason cited
by an immigration judge must “bear a legitimate nexus to the
finding.” 42 Credibility determinations in asylum claims are often
dispositive, and are primarily based upon subjective analysis. 43 As
such, these determinations are particularly prone to abuse and
erroneous conclusions.
1.

Grasping at Minor Inconsistencies.

Assessing the credibility of an alien claiming past or future
persecution in a foreign country requires an astute judge of character.
In a majority of cases, an alien has little or no supporting
documentation due to the circumstances under which the alien left his
or her respective country. Much of an IJ’s analysis will thus be
predicated upon the testimony of an alien and accompanying
witnesses, if any. To add to the difficulty of this process, it is
inevitable that an IJ will be presented with fraudulent claims of
persecution on a somewhat regular basis given the benefits a grant of
asylum bestows. Yet, as an adjudicator, it is the responsibility of an IJ
to sift through the testimony and discern that which is truthful and that
which is false. The Seventh Circuit understands the gravity of this
task, but insists that far too often immigration judges and the BIA
cling to minor inconsistencies that have no bearing on the overall
validity of the asylum claim. 44
For example, in Lhanzom v. Gonzales the Seventh Circuit recently
chastised the analysis of an IJ’s adverse credibility determination as
fraught with findings of inconsistent testimony from the alien that in

41

Ahmad v. INS, 163 F.3d 457, 461 (7th Cir. 1999).
Lhanzom v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 833, 843 (7th Cir. 2005).
43
See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (2005).
44
Lhanzom, 430 F.3d at 848 (citing Korniejew v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 377, 38687 (7th Cir. 2004) to criticize the increasing reliance by the BIA and IJs upon
perceived inconsistencies in testimony as the basis for adverse credibility
determinations, even in cases where the alleged discrepancies are minor or easily
explained).
42
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fact did not exist. 45 Here, an alien who sought asylum supplemented
her claim through the testimony of her father, a seventy-nine-year-old
Tibetan man. 46 Throughout the father’s lengthy examination by the
immigration judge there appears in the record many instances of
miscommunication between the witness and the IJ;
miscommunications which the IJ deemed to represent
inconsistencies. 47 The Court noted that the immigration judge
responded with “unusual defensiveness” when the alien’s attorney
attempted to correct those misunderstandings. 48 The alien’s father
acknowledged that much of his testimony was based upon matters for
which he had little personal knowledge and he was simply relaying
what he had heard, yet the IJ based much of his incredibility decision
on internal inconsistencies between the testimony of the alien’s father
and the account of the alien herself. 49 In fact, the Seventh Circuit
noted that “the IJ did not comment on [the alien’s] demeanor as a
witness but relied entirely on these alleged inconsistencies in finding
her not credible.” 50 The Court further stated that “in reviewing the
transcript of [the alien’s father’s] testimony, again, the only thing that
is clear is the level of confusion during his testimony as the IJ
continued to question him about matters for which he had no personal
knowledge.” 51 In granting the petition for review, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that the “IJ’s conclusion is based on an assumption and
assumption cannot form the basis of impeachment.” 52

45

See Lhanzom, 430 F.3d 833.
Id. at 837-39.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 837.
49
Id. at 844-45.
50
Id. at 843.
51
Id. at 845. Moreover, the Court lamented the “frequent insensitivity in
immigration hearings to the possibilities of misunderstandings caused by the use of
translators of difficult languages such as Chinese. Id. (citing Zen Li Iao v. Gonzales,
400 F.3d 530, 534 (7th Cir. 2005)).
52
Lhanzom, 430 F.3d at 846 (citing Korniejew v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 377, 383
(7th Cir. 2004)).
46
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This case represents a mounting concern of the Seventh Circuit
that IJs and the BIA have increasingly grasped onto “perceived
inconsistencies” in testimony as the basis for incredibility
determinations, even where such inconsistencies are immaterial and
could be readily explained. 53 In an overzealous effort to weed out
fraudulent claims from those with merit, or perhaps responding to
internal pressure from the executive branch of the government,
immigration adjudicators have scrutinized the record looking for gaps
and latent ambiguities instead of looking at the overall plausibility of
an alien’s claim. 54 This type of error was prevalent in the asylum
decisions reviewed by the Seventh Circuit during its last term. 55
This problem has been created by the DHS and the DOJ
themselves. As the number of immigration appeals rises,56
immigration adjudicators presumably need to cut corners at an
53

Lhanzom, 430 F.3d at 848 (citing Korniejew, 371 F.3d at 386-87).
Since 9/11, the rate at which asylum has been granted by the United States
has dropped. In 2000, about forty-four percent of asylum cases were granted, in
2003 only twenty-nine percent of asylum cases were granted. Eleanor Acer, Refuge
in an Insecure Time: Seeking Asylum in the Post-9/11 United States, 28 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 1361, 1384 (2005); see also Karen C. Tumlin, Suspect First: How
Terrorism Policy is Reshaping Immigration Policy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1173, 1190
(2004) (discussing Mar. 18, 2003 press conference of Secretary of Department of
Homeland Security Tom Ridge introducing Operation Liberty Shield, a transcript of
which is available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=525 (last visited
Apr. 26, 2006)). From the context of this briefing, there seems to be a government
presumption against the validity of asylum claims.
55
See, e.g., Tabaku v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 417 (7th Cir. 2005); Ssali v.
Gonzales, 424 F.3d 556 (7th Cir. 2005); Galicia v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 529 (7th Cir.
2005); Sosnovskaia v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 589 (7th Cir. 2005); Dong v. Gonzales,
421 F.3d 573 (7th Cir. 2005); Hor v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 2005);
Nakibuka v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 2005).
56
“The expanded streamlining procedures have allowed the BIA to allocate its
limited resources to adjudicate more than 40,000 new appeals and other matters filed
annually, and to steadily reduce its pending caseload from 56,000 in August 2002 to
approximately 33,000 by October 2004.” U.S. Department of Justice: Executive
Office for Immigration Review, BIA Restructuring and Streamlining Procedures,
(Dec. 8, 2004 revised), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/04/BIAStreamlining120804.pdf (last visited Apr.
26, 2006).
54
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increased rate. With the enactment of the streamlining policy,
discussed in more depth below, the number of cases reviewed by a
BIA panel has sharply dropped. 57 The result is less scrutiny given to
adverse credibility determinations based on perceived inconsistencies;
culminating in a breakdown or at least a dilution of the appellate
process. A procedural change in the immigration adjudication process
is necessary to combat this problem unless the level of analysis
provided by IJs begins to increase across the board. However, the
proposition of an increased quality of analysis provided by IJs is
unlikely to come to fruition without a major increase in training and
resources, particularly since immigration adjudication error stems
from a variety of sources.
2.

Do Cultural Bias, Indifference, or Unjust Skepticism
Factor Into Asylum Adjudications?

An alternative problem in credibility assessments is the lack of
cultural awareness exhibited by many IJs and the BIA. The Seventh
Circuit recently noted that the “lack of familiarity with relevant
foreign cultures” evidenced in immigration cases was “disturbing.” 58
This problem is almost exclusively isolated to the arena of asylum
adjudication. Each decision in an asylum case has the distinction of
being generally unique from all other asylum cases. An alien’s
application is based on the particular circumstances surrounding that
alien’s life as seen through his or her own eyes. Though many aspects
of asylum cases may be similar, particularly when aliens are seeking
asylum from the same country, the factors incumbent to an alien’s
claim for asylum, such as his or her ethnicity, religion, political or
social beliefs, and the varying degrees of persecution that a particular
alien has been subjected to, are highly individualized and ensure that
no two stories will be exactly the same. Moreover, conditions in
countries from which aliens seek asylum continually change as
governments rise and fall and popular opinions sway. This state of
57
58

Id.
Zen Li Iao v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 2005).
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perpetual flux poses difficulties for an immigration judge in assessing
the validity of an asylum claim. For instance, stare decisis will rarely
be invoked unless an asylum application and country conditions
essentially mirror that of a prior opinion. In addition, an IJ must
attempt to accurately determine the state of the conditions in the
country the alien is fleeing both at the time of alleged past persecution
and at a future time should the alien be returned to that country. 59
Despite all of these issues, an immigration judge and the BIA are
still representatives of the judiciary and must behave accordingly to
preserve our notions of justice and judicial impartiality. Therefore, it
is incumbent upon each immigration adjudicator to approach each
asylum case without preconceived notions of proper behavior or
mannerisms without sufficient and reliable knowledge of an
applicant’s culture, ethnicity, and religion among other factors, and the
geopolitical state of affairs in the country from which that alien is
fleeing. This must be done in order to correctly assess the inherent
plausibility of that applicant’s asylum claim. Although it may seem
natural to believe that IJs and the BIA are continually mindful of these
factors in processing asylum claims, recent opinions of the Seventh
Circuit prove otherwise.
In Tabaku v. Gonzales, a Christian church driver did not report a
rape and murder he had witnessed after his life had been threatened in
the same incident. One of the grounds relied upon by the immigration
judge in a finding of adverse credibility was the conclusion that a
Christian had a moral and legal obligation to report the incidents, and
that some sort of record would thus have been formed. 60 Since the
alien was unable to provide documentation to support this story, this
became a factor in the IJ’s finding of adverse credibility. The Seventh
Circuit admonished the IJ for substituting the IJ’s own concept of what
it means to be a Christian, an impermissible error, and also noted that
crimes continually go unreported when a witness’ slife is endangered
even in the United States. 61
59

8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (2005); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006).
Tabaku v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 417, 422 (7th Cir. 2005).
61
Id.
60
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This type of error calls into question the level of influence
subjective determinations made by immigration judges should warrant
in credibility assessments. As shown by the high rate of reversals, the
substitution of cultural contexts often leads to conclusions
inappropriate under the circumstances the alien faced. This
consequently deprives aliens of fair and impartial analyses of their
applications. 62 Yet, aside from advising the judge to leave behind any
preconceived notions of cultural decorum, the options to remedy this
problem are few. Each case may represent an entirely different
cultural context than the last and it can hardly be expected of an IJ or
the BIA to become a veritable expert in every culture that comes
before their court. Nor can it realistically be expected of any
adjudicator to approach a case with an entirely blank slate. 63 What the
Seventh Circuit seems to be advocating however, is that an IJ or the
BIA take sufficient time to acquaint themselves with the relevant
culture, discern the societal differences from United States’ culture
inherent to that culture, and make an unbiased and good faith
credibility assessment applying those principles. However, without
any further stimulus from the DHS and the DOJ, agencies not
particularly responsive to lobbying on behalf of aliens, the Seventh
Circuit may have to suffice for wishful thinking and the generation of
recurring criticism in its opinions.
In addition to cultural bias, skepticism, although a healthy
moderator of truth at certain times, has also become prevalent in
asylum adjudication, at times unjustly. Perhaps there is a rational
basis for this given that there are certainly a multitude of fabricated
stories thrust upon IJs on a routine basis. Or perhaps it has more to do
with political ideologies that disfavor immigrants and asylum seekers
62

“Fact-finders in the United States, blinded by their particular world-views,
often expect other cultures to operate by familiar rules and reject information that
does not conform to those expectations. This type of expectation colors the way
fact-finders receive and evaluate asylum seekers’ testimony.” Carla Pike, The
Human Condition and Universality in Credibility Determinations: How Cultural
Assumptions Skew Asylum Decisions, 10-10 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 2 (2005).
63
Id. (suggesting that immigration judges should receive training on their own
cultural biases and how these biases effect their assessment of asylum claims).
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following 9/11. 64 Regardless of its origin, the Seventh Circuit has
held that unwarranted skepticism is not sufficient for an adverse
credibility determination and that the record must substantiate any
skepticism at all. 65
In Dong v. Gonzales, a Chinese alien testified that four village
officials came to her house upon learning she was pregnant, and
coerced her into going to the hospital. 66 Upon arriving at the hospital
the alien was subject to an abortion despite her pleas that she wanted
to keep her child. 67 The immigration judge doubted whether four
government officials would actually have traveled to the alien’s
house. 68 In granting the alien’s petition for review, the Seventh Circuit
responded that “[t]here is nothing in the record that affirmatively
supports the IJ’s assumption that village officials would not act as [the
alien] described. The IJ’s skepticism alone, in light of [the alien’s]
consistent testimony, does not support a negative credibility
determination.” 69
Regardless of the underlying reason behind such skepticism, the
fact remains that there are many honest applicants who have suffered
horrific atrocities and who should not be subjected to warrantless
skepticism. The Seventh Circuit has made it clear that immigration
judges must be mindful of their appointments as adjudicators and that
by allowing any cynical dismissal of an alien’s claim to enter into their
judgment they consequently ignore the responsibilities incumbent to
that role. 70 As such, skepticism, though perhaps warranted in a
number of cases, must be amply supported and tempered with an open
mind.
64

See Tumlin, supra note 54, at 1190.
Dong v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 573, 578 (7th Cir. 2005).
66
Id. at 575.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 578.
69
Id. (citations omitted).
70
See Dong, 421 F.3d 573; see also Shtaro v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 711, 715 (7th
Cir. 2006) (“[T]he IJ points to no evidence to support [the IJ’s] assumptions about
the motivations of [the alien’s] alleged persecutors, and [the alien’s] story is not so
inherently improbable that we can uphold the IJ’s decision without such evidence.”).
65
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It is difficult to discern precisely whether the tendency to be
overly skeptical stems solely from the cultural backgrounds of IJs, or
if it is also a product of governmental policy. It is no secret that the
government has recently sought to curb high levels of immigration,
particularly since 9/11. 71 Regardless of the root, the DOJ and DHS are
the sole entities that can force immigration adjudicators to give a bit
more credence to alien testimony.
3.

Congress Creates New Standards for Credibility Assessments.

Congress recently enacted legislation that revised the standards by
which immigration judges reach credibility determinations in asylum
adjudications. 72 Perhaps this was an effort to remedy the large number
of erroneous or unfounded immigration judge credibility assessments.
However, under the newly enacted provisions, a grant of asylum may
be much more difficult to obtain. The REAL ID Act of 2005 provides
the following basis upon which credibility should be determined:
(iii) Credibility determination. -- Considering the
totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a
trier of fact may base a credibility determination on the
demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or
witness, the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s or
witness’s account, the consistency between the
applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements
(whenever made and whether or not under oath, and
considering the circumstances under which the
statements were made), the internal consistency of each
such statement, the consistency of such statements with
other evidence of record (including the reports of the
Department of State on country conditions), and any
inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without
71

See supra note 54.
REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231
§ 101 (2005).
72
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regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or
falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or
any other relevant factor. There is no presumption of
credibility, however, if no adverse credibility
determination is explicitly made, the applicant or
witness shall have a rebuttable presumption of
credibility on appeal. 73
However, this particular amendment of the Act took effect on May 11,
2005 and applies solely to applications for asylum made on or after
that date. 74
It may be possible that a more clearly delineated credibility
assessment standard may help reduce the number of asylum reversals
granted by the federal courts. However, the standard promulgated
under the REAL ID Act greatly enlarges the authority of an IJ to rule
adversely on the credibility of an alien, under conditions the Seventh
Circuit has disapproved of in its recent opinions. 75 Moreover, the
REAL ID Act did not expressly address the standard of review
applicable to credibility determinations. 76 Therefore, the Seventh
Circuit and other circuit courts will continue to review credibility
determinations assessed under the new standards by application of the
substantial evidence standard requiring support by reasonable,
substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a

73

Id. (codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B) (2005)).
REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 § 101(h)(2). See
also Ssali v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 556, 562 (7th Cir. 2005). The opinions of the
Seventh Circuit issued within the applicable time period this Comment addresses do
not apply this new standard; the adjudication, and accompanying review, of asylum
applications often may take several years before a final administrative order is
reached.
75
See REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 § 101 (2005).
See also Lhanzom v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 2005); Korniejew v. Ashcroft,
371 F.3d 377 (7th Cir. 2004).
76
REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 § 101 (2005).
74
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whole. 77 Indeed, the passage of this new standard may produce
unanticipated problems further complicating the credibility
determination process and resulting in little progress towards the
reduction of circuit court reversals.
4.

Will the REAL ID Act of 2005 Benefit or Impair
Credibility Assessments?

There has been, and continues to be, a substantial amount of
opposition to the enactment of the REAL ID Act of 2005 from a large
variety of sources, particularly the provisions concerning asylum
applicants. 78 Initially, the language concerning credibility
determinations performed by IJs has drawn serious ire from
opponents. 79 The most troublesome language under the Act will allow
an immigration judge to base an asylum credibility determination on
the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or witness. 80
Although normally beneficial in the general civil or criminal hearing
context, using these criteria is problematic in the asylum arena.
Demeanor is a highly cultural phenomenon and is a highly
subjective determination. An evaluation of demeanor may be no more
than an exercise in contrasting cultures. It essentially pits the cultural
background of the IJ, established as the norm, against the background
of the alien. This propensity to transpose may be based on the
ingrained human tendency to perceive things based on our own
experiences and point of view. 81 One can hardly fault immigration
judges for being human. But the responsibilities of an IJ, like almost
77

Id. See also Liu v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 307, 312 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting INS
v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992)).
78
REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 § 101 (2005). See
also Human Rights First, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/asylum/realid/pdf/signon-letter-042105.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2006) (Apr. 21, 2005 letter to Congress
signed by over 80 organizations and 80 individuals opposing Section 101 of the
REAL ID Act of 2005).
79
Id.
80
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B) (2005).
81
Pike, supra note 62, at 2.
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no other legal profession, require a worldly perspective on cultural
differences. What may seem to be irrational behavior based on U.S.
standards may be entirely appropriate given the circumstances and
conditions concurrent in the country from which an alien is fleeing.
To then gauge an alien’s credibility based on his or her demeanor in
such a context unfairly creates bias against that alien. For example,
refraining from making eye contact may represent a sign of respect
and submission to authority in some cultures, wherein the U.S. an
immigration judge may perceive an avoidance of eye contact as an
indication that an alien is being untruthful. 82
In addition, emotions can often play a large factor in credibility
assessments performed by IJs, yet they may often be misleading. In
asylum claims, an alien may often be forced to discuss horrible
traumas perpetrated upon themselves and their families. It is not
uncommon, and in most cases the norm, to encounter stories of
beatings, rape, and murder. One might expect highly emotional
testimony exhibited by an alien when discussing such incidents, yet
this is not always the case. “Torture victims often have what mental
health professionals call a ‘blank affect’ when recounting their
experiences, a demeanor that an adjudicator might misinterpret as
demonstrating lack of credibility.” 83 Even in the presence of a judge,
aliens, and humans in general, deal with emotional issues in different
ways; some may break down in sorrow at a hearing while others may
contain their emotions inside as a coping mechanism. An IJ that is
indifferent, aloof, skeptical, or perhaps even biased against these
differences can have a profound effect on an alien’s ability to freely
discuss the events surrounding that alien’s asylum claim. This, in turn,
can unfairly result in an adverse credibility determination due to the
alien’s demeanor, candor, or responsiveness under the new credibility
82

Human Rights First, REAL ID Endangers People Fleeing Persecution,
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/asylum/asylum_10_sensenbr.asp (last visited Apr.
26, 2006).
83
Amnesty International U.S.A., The REAL ID Act of 2005 and Its Negative
Impact on Asylum Seekers, Mar. 2005,
http://www.amnestyusa.org/uspolicy/pdf/realid_0305.pdf (last visited Apr. 26,
2006).
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standards. This may produce erroneous conclusions as to the
credibility of an alien or his or her witnesses. When reviewing
decisions using these standards in the future, the Seventh Circuit may
use some skepticism of its own.
The REAL ID Act may also increase the prevalence of
immigration adjudication error concerning adverse credibility
determinations based on minor inconsistencies. 84 The amended
language allows immigration judges and the BIA to base an adverse
credibility determination on any inconsistencies, regardless of whether
they go to “the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 85 Consider this new
standard in the context of Lhanzom. 86 The inconsistencies between
the father’s testimony and that of the alien, which arose primarily from
the father’s confusion and miscommunication with the IJ, would be a
suitable basis for an adverse credibility finding under the REAL ID
Act language. 87 This conclusion seems to be a particularly harsh
result and may clash with the Seventh Circuit’s notion of fairness in
asylum adjudications. 88
Cultural bias and erroneously subjective analyses of immigration
judges in credibility assessments already has become a veritable,
recurring cornerstone of immigration reversals, rearing their heads in
decisions such as Dong, Tabaku, and Lhanzom. 89 Therefore,
84

REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 § 101 (2005).
Id. (codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B) (2005)).
86
Lhanzom v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 833, 837-39 (7th Cir. 2005).
87
See Lhanzom, 430 F.3d at 837-39. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 10913, 119 Stat. 231 § 101 (2005).
88
The Seventh Circuit has also reversed cased concerning material
inconsistencies upon discovering that the inconsistencies are not inconsistencies at
all. See Ssali v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 556, 563 (7th Cir. 2005) (In which both an IJ
and the BIA mistakenly thought that an alien was from an entirely different part of
his respective country, a location in which membership in the alien’s political group
would be unlikely and would pose no danger. Yet, the alien actually hailed from the
opposite side of the country, which supported his claim. The Court noted that this
represented a “very significant mistake” which “suggests the Board was not aware of
the most basic facts of [the alien’s] case.”).
89
Dong v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 573 (7th Cir. 2005); Tabaku v. Gonzales, 425
F.3d 417 (7th Cir. 2005); Lhanzom v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 2005).
85
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application of new standards under the REAL ID Act will serve only
to exacerbate the current credibility assessment problems the Seventh
Circuit is forced to address through its reversals. 90 Thus, it stands to
reason that the Court’s high reversal rate in asylum petitions will
continue until the government addresses the problem from within.
The problems recently noted by the Seventh Circuit, reliance on
minor inconsistencies, cultural bias or indifference, and unjust
skepticism among others, can only be addressed organically by the
DHS and DOJ. The Seventh Circuit can reverse and not so subtly hint
at what can be done to remedy these problems, but Congress and the
agencies themselves are ultimately responsible for changing
procedures and policies. Perhaps this was the goal when the new
credibility standards were recently enacted. Yet, the new language
includes highly subjective terms and may actually result in asylum
adjudications becoming more susceptible to the problems addressed.
Although the agencies may have meant to alleviate error in credibility
assessments, substantially increased subjective leeway given to asylum
adjudicators is not the answer the Seventh Circuit had in mind. In
order to comport with the Seventh Circuit’s decisions, asylum
adjudicators should be given less subjective sway in asylum decisions.

B. When May an Immigration Adjudicator Require an Alien to
Provide Corroborating Evidence?
1. Is an Alien’s Credible Testimony Alone
Sufficient for an Asylum Grant?

90

“[T]he natural tendency of the asylum provisions of the REAL ID Act will
likely be to provide statutory cover for shoddy decision-making.” Acer, supra note
54 at 1393.

239
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol1/iss1/12

24

Floss: Seeking Asylum in a Hostile System: The Seventh Circuit Reverses

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 1, Issue 1

Spring 2006

As noted previously, credibility determinations play a vital role in
the success of an asylum application. 91 Yet, intertwined with
credibility is the concept of corroboration. In certain circumstances an
immigration judge or the BIA may require an alien to produce
evidence in addition to his or her own testimony which corroborates
the alien’s claim of past persecution or a well-founded fear of future
persecution. 92
The Seventh Circuit has often held that a credible asylum
applicant need not provide corroborating evidence in order to meet his
or her burden of proof. 93 Indeed, the plain language of 8 C.F.R. §
208.13(a) provides that “the testimony of the applicant, if credible,
may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof without
corroboration.” 94 However, the BIA has not been quite as lenient in its
interpretation. The BIA has interpreted the regulatory language above
as permitting an immigration judge to require corroboration from an
alien deemed credible in situations “where it is reasonable to expect
corroborating evidence for certain alleged facts pertaining to the
specifics of an applicant’s claim.” 95 The Seventh Circuit, however,
has been uncomfortable with an imposed requirement of corroborating
evidence when an alien is otherwise credible, even when such
imposition is discretionary, and has reversed IJ decisions that have
denied a credible alien’s asylum claim solely because that alien could
not provide corroborating documents. 96
Choosing to invest more credence in the testimony of alien
applicants, the Seventh Circuit has held that “corroborating evidence is
essential to bolster an otherwise unconvincing case, but when an
91

See supra Part III.A.
Dawoud v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 608, 612 (7th Cir. 2005).
93
Id.
94
8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (2000).
95
Dawoud, 424 F.3d at 612 (citing In re S-M-J, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 725
(B.I.A. 1997)).
96
Id. (citing see Zheng v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 804, 810 (7th Cir. 2005); Lin v.
Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 748, 756 (7th Cir. 2004); Diallo v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 687, 695
(7th Cir. 2004); Ememe v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 446, 453 (7th Cir. 2004); Uwase v.
Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 1039, 1045 (7th Cir. 2003)).
92
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asylum applicant does testify credibly, 97 it is not necessary for [the
alien] to submit corroborating evidence in order to sustain [the alien’s]
burden of proof.” 98 In order to deny asylum relief for lack of
corroborating evidence, an immigration judge must: (1) make an
explicit credibility finding; (2) explain why additional corroboration is
reasonable; and, (3) explain why the alien’s explanation for not
producing the requested corroboration is inadequate. 99
The Seventh Circuit has also taken notice that the federal circuit
courts have split on their application of corroboration requirements;
the Ninth Circuit dispensing of any corroboration requirement once
credible testimony has been established and the Second, Third, Sixth,
and Eight Circuits essentially deferring to the BIA’s position that an
alien may be required to submit corroborating evidence even after a
favorable credibility determination has been made. 100 Yet, while the
Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) is applicable to
its decisions reviewed for this Comment, this split has become moot as
applied to future asylum adjudications given the enactment of the
REAL ID Act. 101
2.

Congress Creates New Standards for the Requirement of
Corroborating Evidence.

97

Credible testimony defined as testimony that is “specific, detailed, and
convincing.” Dawoud v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 608, 612 (7th Cir. 2005).
98
Lin v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 748, 751 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Uwase, 349 F.3d
at 1041). “The testimony of the applicant, if credible, may be sufficient to sustain
the burden of proof without corroboration.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (2000).
99
Dong v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 573, 579 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Gontcharova v.
Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 873, 877 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Huang v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d
945, 951 (7th Cir. 2005)).
100
Dawoud, 424 F.3d at 613 (citing Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 899 (9th Cir.
2000); see also Dorosh v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 379, 382-83 (6th Cir. 2004); El-Sheikh
v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 643, 647 (8th Cir. 2004); Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542,
551 (3d. Cir. 2001); Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d 279, 285-86 (2d Cir. 2000)).
101
REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 § 101 (2005).
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Congress addressed situations in which an immigration
adjudicator may require an alien to provide corroborating evidence
through the enactment of the REAL ID Act of 2005. 102 Specifically,
the Act provides that a requirement of corroboration necessary to
supplement testimony is to be assessed as follows:
(ii) Sustaining burden. -- The testimony of the
applicant may be sufficient to sustain the applicant’s
burden without corroboration, but only if the applicant
satisfies the trier of fact that the applicant’s testimony is
credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific facts
sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant is a refugee.
In determining whether the applicant has met the
applicant’s burden, the trier of fact may weigh the
credible testimony along with other evidence of record.
Where the trier of fact determines that the applicant
should provide evidence that corroborates otherwise
credible testimony, such evidence must be provided
unless the applicant does not have the evidence and
cannot reasonably obtain the evidence. 103
However, similar to the amendments to credibility assessments
addressed above in Part III.A.3, the amendments addressing
corroboration requirements applies solely to asylum applications made
on or after May 11, 2005. 104
The amended language which allows an adjudicator to impose a
requirement of corroborating evidence on a credible alien, albeit when
evidence is reasonably available, is incongruent with the Seventh
Circuit’s previous standard that an otherwise credible alien may not be

102

Id.
Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2005).
104
REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 § 101(h)(2)
(2005). Therefore, recent opinions of the Seventh Circuit have not reviewed
decisions subject to the new standards.
103
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forced to provide corroborating evidence. 105 Thus, although utilizing
the new burden of proof test for corroborating evidence may lead to a
reduction in the number of reversals issued by the Seventh Circuit
concerning corroboration, this will simply be because the Seventh
Circuit must acquiesce to the statutory language, not because it agrees
with the imposition of a corroborating evidence requirement on an
otherwise credible alien. The new standard of sustaining burden
mirrors the aforementioned position of the BIA, 106 and prior decisions
of the Seventh Circuit have demonstrated its disapproval of the BIA’s
position and the subsequent outcomes rendered in the application of
this position. 107
An alternative provision of the REAL ID Act amends the standard
of review to be applied by federal circuit courts when assessing an
imposed requirement of corroborating evidence.108 In contrast to the
provision above, the language amending the standard of review
became immediately applicable to all asylum adjudications in which a
final administrative order has been issued. 109 The amended section
provides that “[n]o court shall reverse a determination made by a trier
of fact with respect to the availability of corroborating evidence . . .
unless the court finds . . . that a reasonable trier of fact is compelled to
conclude that such corroborating evidence is unavailable.” 110
105

Dawoud, 424 F.3d at 612 (holding that a credible asylum applicant need not
provide corroborating evidence in order to meet his or her burden of proof).
106
Id.,(citing In re S-M-J, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 725 (BIA 1997); see also In re
M-D-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1180, 1183-84 (B.I.A. 1998)).
107
Dawoud, 424 F.3d at 612 (citing Zheng v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 804, 810 (7th
Cir. 2005); Lin v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 748, 756 (7th Cir. 2004); Diallo v. Ashcroft,
381 F.3d 687, 695 (7th Cir. 2004); Ememe v. Ashcroft¸ 358 F.3d 446, 453 (7th Cir.
2004); Uwase v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 1039, 1045 (7th Cir. 2003)).
108
REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 § 101(e) (2005)
(codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) (2005)).
109
REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 § 101(h)(3)
(2005).
110
Id. at § 101(e) (codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)). This section of the Act
applies “to all cases in which the final administrative removal order is or was issued
before, on, or after [May 11, 2005],” thus providing for express retroactive
application of the Act. Id.
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This language does not significantly differ from the substantial
evidence standard normally employed by the circuit courts and should
not significantly alter the level of scrutiny applied. 111 However, the
new standard of review does provide the Seventh Circuit and other
circuit courts with some ability to limit impositions of corroborating
evidence requirements on credible aliens, albeit only to the extent that
the reviewing court finds that such corroborating evidence would be
unavailable. 112 Pity the credible alien who leaves behind available
evidence.
3.

Will the REAL ID Act of 2005 Allow Fair Application of
Corroboration Requirements?

As noted, the new language concerning an alien’s burden stands in
contrast to the Seventh Circuit’s prior tenet that credible aliens need
not supply corroborating evidence. 113 The Seventh Circuit’s position
may stem from the logical premise that if an alien has provided
testimony that an adjudicator deems credible, it is unnecessary and
perhaps unfair to require more from that alien. 114 In addition, recent
opinions of the Seventh Circuit have identified many of the same types
of subjectivity problems in corroboration requirements as those found

111

Substantial evidence “means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v.
Ewing, 174 F.2d 676, 691 (9th Cir. 1949) cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949), reh.
denied, 339 U.S. 945 (1950) (citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. Nat’l Labor
Relations Bd., 305 U.S. 197, 229-230 (1838)).
112
REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 § 101(e) (2005)
(codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) (2005)).
113
Dawoud v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 608, 612 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that a
credible asylum applicant need not provide corroborating evidence in order to meet
his or her burden of proof).
114
“The BIA’s rule unfairly casts the asylum applicant as ‘guilty until proven
innocent’ in her efforts to establish a claim for which she has already provided
credible, unrefuted, direct, and specific testimony.” 3-34 CHARLES GORDON,
STANLEY MAILMAN & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE
§ 34.02 (2006).
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in credibility assessments. 115 Both the standard of review and burden
of proof tests are premised on the interpretation of what is reasonable
and when evidence is obtainable or available.116 These are subjective
tests that remain susceptible to the same criticisms of bias,
indifference, or ignorance applicable to credibility determinations.
Although the amended standard of review language may enable the
Seventh Circuit and other reviewing courts to remedy some of these
issues, several recent Seventh Circuit decisions exemplify the
problems inherent in applying the new standards.
In Hor v. Gonzales, the Seventh Circuit’s concern with cultural
bias is noticeably pronounced. 117 Here, an alien sought to escape an
Islamic guerrilla movement engaged in civil war against the Algerian
government. 118 The alien was nearly executed by the guerillas,
escaping only after police shot and killed two of the assailants. 119 The
IJ, in holding that corroborating evidence was available and could
have been obtained, criticized the alien’s failure to provide newspaper
articles or affidavits from his co-workers and his inability to
corroborate the story of a roadblock and ensuing gun battle with any
paperwork. 120 The Seventh Circuit noted that the IJ failed to take into
account that Algeria was a military dictatorship with a state run
media. 121 Nor did the IJ take into account the probability that the
acquaintances of the alien still located within Algeria would not want
to go on public record describing the actions of the guerillas; 122 to
make this assumption implies the IJ did not view the availability of the

115

See Galicia v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 2005); Hor v. Gonzales,
421 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 2005); Soumahoro v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 2005).
116
REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 § 101 (2005).
117
Hor, 421 F.3d 497.
118
Id. at 498-500.
119
Id. at 499.
120
Id. at 499-501.
121
Id. at 500-501.
122
See Matter of S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722 (B.I.A. 1997) (Rosenberg, Board
Member, concurring).
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evidence from the perspective of the alien. In granting the petition for
review, the Court stated:
[t]he notion that documentation is as regular,
multicopied, and ubiquitous in disordered nations as in
the United States, a notion that crops up frequently in
decisions by immigration judges . . . is unrealistic
concerning conditions actually prevailing in the Third
World. To be entitled to deference, a determination of
availability must rest on more than implausible
assertion backed up by no facts. 123
In another example exemplifying the dangers of subjectivity and
bias inherent in the corroboration requirement, the alien in Soumahoro
v. Gonzales sought to provide the IJ with corroborating documents
such as a birth certificate, national identification card, newspaper
articles, and official letters that had been airmailed to the United States
by a friend of the alien still located within the alien’s former country
of Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast). 124 The outbreak of war delayed the
shipment and the package was originally shipped to the wrong address
(the alien provided a copy of the incorrect mailing airbill). 125 The IJ
came to the puzzling conclusion that the alien had arranged for an
empty box to be sent to himself in order to delay his proceedings. 126
The immigration judge denied a request by the alien’s attorney for a
continuance until the documents could arrive and subsequently held a
hearing in which asylum was denied (the package containing the
documents arrived two days later). 127 This clearly represented a
situation in which it was unreasonable for the IJ to require the
123

Hor, 421 F.3d at 501 (citing Zen Li Iao v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 530, 534 (7th
Cir. 2005); Gontcharova v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 873, 877-78 (7th Cir. 2003); Muhur
v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 958, 959-60 (7th Cir. 2004); Mulanga v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d
123, 134 (3d Cir. 2003); Qiu v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 140, 153 (2d Cir. 2003)).
124
Soumahoro v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 732, 736-37 (7th Cir. 2005).
125
Id.
126
Id. at 735.
127
Id.
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corroborating documents at the time of the original hearing,
particularly when the alien’s reason for not producing the documents
on time was much more plausible than that provided by the IJ. 128
In yet another recent opinion, both cultural differences and
immigration judge bias factor into an erroneous denial due to an
alien’s failure to provide sufficient corroborating evidence. 129 In
Galicia v. Gonzales, an alien asserted that the Guatemalan government
had persecuted her and that her husband was a dissident who had been
murdered. 130 In an effort to corroborate her claim, she attempted to
enter into the record the testimony of two experts, only to have the
immigration judge deny such testimony citing time constraints. 131 In
addition, the IJ also held that the alien’s lack of evidence corroborating
the registration of a car allegedly owned by the alien found near her
husband’s body adversely affected her credibility. 132
The Seventh Circuit disagreed with this analysis, holding that the
refusal of the court to hear the expert testimony represented a denial of
due process, that the experts could have provided corroborating
testimony, and that the IJ’s reliance on the lack of evidence
corroborating the car registration failed because it was irrelevant to the
issues the alien presented. 133 Echoing the language of the amended
standard of review, the Court held that “a reasonable trier of fact
[would be] compelled to conclude that such corroborating evidence
was unavailable.” 134 Moreover, the Seventh Circuit has previously
held that “corroboration should be required only as to ‘material
facts’.” 135 Thus, the registration of a car located near the alien’s
recently murdered husband did not constitute a material fact, was

128

Id. at 737.
See Galicia v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 2005).
130
Id.
131
Id. at 533.
132
Id. at 537.
133
Id. at 537-39.
134
Id. at 538.
135
Balogun v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 492, 502 (7th Cir. 2004).
129
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irrelevant to the issues, and would have provided little corroboration
towards the relevant issues. 136
This case demonstrates the dangers inherent in allowing the
applications of otherwise credible aliens to be denied based solely on
the subjective test of when corroborating evidence is available and
when it is reasonable to require such evidence. The IJ may substitute
his or her own notions concerning the availability of paperwork and
other evidence in countries across the world that the IJ may know little
or nothing about. Further, and even more grievous, an immigration
judge may show simple bias in the application of “subjective” tests,
such as the exclusion of the alien’s corroborating experts do to “time
constraints” as witnessed in Galicia. 137
Similar to problems identified in credibility determinations, the
Seventh Circuit seems to believe errors commonly arise when
adjudicators substitute their own experiences, or perhaps expectations,
for that of the alien. 138 In other words, the IJ doesnot consider the
circumstances under which a particular alien has been forced to depart
his or her country. An IJ, or any individual living in the U.S., has an
expectation that should someone be injured, harassed, or killed,
records will be readily accessible and available. Such a person expects
almost every type of record to be available, whether it be birth
certificates, death certificates, arrest records, hospital records, or
anything of the like. Yet, as the Seventh Circuit has noted:
[m]any asylum applicants flee their home countries
under circumstances of great urgency. Some are
literally running for their lives and have to abandon
their families, friends, jobs, and material possessions
without a word of explanation. They often have
nothing but the shirts on their backs when they arrive in
136

See Galicia, 422 F.3d at 537.
Id. at 533. In addition, the immigration judge in this proceeding imposed a
strict time limit concerning the testimony of the alien herself, which prevented her
from introducing the testimony of her expert witnesses. Id. at 539.
138
Dawoud v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 608, 612-13 (7th Cir. 2005).
137
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the country. To expect these individuals to stop and
collect dossiers of paperwork before fleeing is both
unrealistic and strikingly insensitive to the harrowing
conditions they face. 139
Under the prevailing standards, it is entirely possible for an
otherwise credible alien, one who has provided specific, detailed, and
persuasive testimony, to be denied asylum if that alien is unable to
provide corroborating evidence if an IJ deems that such evidence is
available. 140 The Seventh Circuit has consistently disapproved of the
BIA position congruent with the prevailing standard. 141 The
imposition of such a requirement has been likened to a request for a
note of persecution from an alien’s persecutors. 142 However, a safety
valve of sorts lies in the newly promulgated standard of review that
allows a court to overturn erroneous corroboration requirements if “a
reasonable trier of fact is compelled to conclude that such
corroborating evidence is unavailable.” 143 Yet, this “safety valve”
does little to benefit a credible alien that has failed to obtain
presumably available evidence.
Ultimately, the decision to amend the corroborating evidence
language and allow the imposition of a corroboration requirement
despite credible testimony represents the resolution of the federal
government to provide immigration adjudicators greater latitude in
which to deny asylum applicants. The new language under which both
corroboration and credibility are assessed provides adjudicators
increased authority to deny asylum applications under a wider variety
of factors. Yet, the Seventh Circuit has recently called immigration
adjudicators to task for their subpar analysis on both credibility
139

Id. (citing see Balogun v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 492, 502 (7th Cir. 2004)).
See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B) (2005).
141
Dawoud, 424 F.3d at 612 (citing see Zheng v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 804, 810
(7th Cir. 2005); Lin v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 748, 756 (7th Cir. 2004); Diallo v.
Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 687, 695 (7th Cir. 2004); Ememe v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 446, 453
(7th Cir. 2004); Uwase v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 1039, 1045 (7th Cir. 2003)).
142
See Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2000).
143
REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 § 101(e) (2005).
140
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assessments and corroboration requirements. 144 This misalignment
certainly will not solve the problem of high immigration petition
reversal. Given the Seventh Circuit’s disapproval of a hard and fast
corroboration requirement that may be imposed regardless of
credibility, and the seemingly cavalier application of the corroboration
requirement by IJs and the BIA as evidenced in recent Seventh Circuit
opinions, it is likely that the Seventh Circuit will attempt to make full
use of the amended standard of review requiring that corroborating
evidence be “available” in order to protect asylum applicants against
erroneous and unsound asylum denials.
C. Are State Department Reports Being Used as a Crutch?
Each year, the United States Department of State issues a report
for every country that assesses and critiques the human rights situation
in that country during the prior year.145 These reports often provide an
extensive reference guide to human rights abuses, frequently citing
specific and often graphic examples. 146 Thus, these reports seem to
provide a solid basis upon which immigration judges may begin to
familiarize themselves in order to fairly adjudicate asylum claims from
a particular country. However, it seems that IJs have often ended their
research at this stage as they have been reprimanded by the Seventh
Circuit and other circuit courts of appeals for their continued overreliance on State Department country reports. 147 Yet, the lack of
otherwise verifiable information concerning conditions inside many of
the oppressive countries from which alien applicants are fleeing makes
144

See Tabaku v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 417 (7th Cir. 2005); Lhanzom v.
Gonzales, 430 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 2005); Hor v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 497 (7th Cir.
2005); Soumahoro v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 2005).
145
See U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,
March 8, 2006, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61551.htm
(last visited Apr. 26, 2006).
146
Id.
147
See, e.g., Koval v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 798, 807-08 (7th Cir. 2005); Shah v.
INS, 220 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2000); El Moraghy v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 195,
204 (1st Cir. 2003).
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it almost certain that these country reports become the yardstick
against which the credibility of an alien’s claim is measured. In
addition, IJs may feel that they are entitled to rely on such documents
given that federal regulations permit such reliance, although
information from other agencies and sources may be submitted as
well. 148
Yet, as noted, the Seventh Circuit seems to believe that
immigration adjudicators defer too often and too quickly to the
information provided in these reports, thus using the reports as a
veritable crutch upon which the support of the adjudicator’s decision
relies. 149 The problem is that an alien may often disagree with some
or many of the findings asserted in the anonymously compiled country
reports, and he or she is left with little or no recourse to challenge
those findings. 150 The Seventh Circuit recently voiced its concern
with an over reliance on country reports in Koval v. Gonzales, noting:
State Department country reports are anonymous in
their authorship.
Decision-makers in the asylum
determination process do not know the identity of the
author, the credentials of the individuals who assemble
the reports, or the trustworthiness of the evidence upon
which the assessments contained in these reports are
based . . . As we have noted previously, the country
reports are prepared in general terms and offer more of
a statement on the relationship of the United States
Government to that country than an account of
individual circumstances. 151
148

An “asylum officer may rely on material provided by the Department of
State.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.12(a) (2000).
149
See Koval, 418 F.3d at 807-08.
150
“Nothing in this part shall be construed to entitle the applicant to conduct
discovery directed toward the records, officers, agents, or employees of the Service,
the Department of Justice, or the Department of State.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.12(b).
151
Koval, 418 F.3d at 807 (citing Galina v. INS, 213 F.3d 955, 959 (7th Cir.
2000) (noting that country reports are “brief and general, and may fail to identify
specific, perhaps local, dangers to particular, perhaps obscure, individuals”); see also
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In Koval, an alien sought asylum from Ukraine due to her
membership in the Mormon Church. 152 The alien attempted to
provide expert testimony from several sources, including a former
KGB agent whom had been based in Ukraine and had been assigned to
a department that monitored the daily activities of the churches in the
Soviet Union. 153 The former agent stated that, although he had not
returned to Ukraine in 12 years, he had maintained his contacts with
sources developed in the KGB and that at the time of the hearing he
currently worked for the United States Government on security issues
relating to Russia and Ukraine. 154 The immigration judge excluded
the testimony of the former KGB agent, asserting that he was not a
qualified expert regarding the treatment of Mormons in Ukraine,
particularly since he had not traveled to Ukraine in 12 years. 155 In
denying the asylum application, the IJ based his conclusion
substantially on the State Department country reports that, in his view,
did not indicate severe mistreatment of Mormons in Ukraine. 156 In
reversing the decision, the Seventh Circuit noted:
[the former KGB agent’s] testimony, had it been
considered, would have placed [an excerpt from the
country report] in a very different light than the one in
which it was placed by the IJ . . . The exclusion of his
testimony was improper; it prevented the petitioners
from showing that the broad assertions of the country
report were indeed subject to qualification – a

El Moraghy v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 195, 204 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting that country
reports should be used for purposes of providing “context and generalized credibility
assessment”)).
152
Koval, 418 F.3d at 800-03.
153
Id. at 802.
154
Id. at 802-03.
155
Id. at 803.
156
Id. at 807.
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qualification that might well have made a difference in
this case. 157
In order to prevent this type of bias in the utilization of these reports,
the Seventh Circuit recommended that immigration adjudicators take
into account both the “practical limitations of these reports and the
practical limitations on asylum applicants to present other expert
testimony and other evidence to rebut the ipse dixit assertions of the
reports.” 158
The prevention of such bias and over reliance is critical in
situations such as this in which an alien is forced to challenge or
contest the assertions of a government-sponsored report in front of a
government-sponsored adjudicatory body. The cards are often not
stacked in the alien’s favor. The Seventh Circuit recognizes the
dangers in this type of reliance and its opinions have clashed with the
regulation allowing such reliance, 159 often simply pointing out the
plausibility of the alien’s claim in spite of, and in the context of, the
country reports. Yet it seems that the Seventh Circuit is swimming
upstream in its criticism of such reliance; the new credibility standards
enacted under the REAL ID Act of 2005 expressly allow an
immigration judge to base credibility determinations upon the
consistency of statements with other evidence of record “including the
reports of the Department of State on country conditions.” 160 Here
again, as with credibility and corroboration, a common error in
adjudicative procedure noted by the Seventh Circuit has been codified
as acceptable in contravention of the Court’s notion of fair and
impartial adjudication. However, it seems doubtful that the Seventh
Circuit will simply acquiesce to asylum denials relying solely or
irrationally upon Department of State country reports. To that end, the
Court may restrain the use of these reports by holding that the

157

Id. at 808.
Id.
159
See 8 C.F.R. § 208.12(a) (2000). See also Koval, 418 F.3d at 807.
160
REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 § 101(e) (2005).
158
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conjecture often contained in such reports is not a substitute for
substantial evidence. 161
IV. SHOULD BLAME LIE WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE?
A. Immigration Judges are Given Little Guidance.
Notwithstanding the problems identified above, it may be unfair
to assume that all fault lies squarely on immigration judges or the BIA.
There are a host of other factors that may play roles responsible for the
high level of reversals issued by the circuit courts of appeals. Despite
all of its criticism, the Seventh Circuit is not entirely without empathy
for the plight of IJs. In the recent decision Djouma v. Gonzales, the
Seventh Circuit opined that the DHS and the DOJ have failed to
provide IJs with systematic guidance as to resolving credibility issues,
and indeed have done little to address problems in these
assessments; 162 problems which leave the Seventh Circuit with little
recourse short of reversals and the granting of petitions for review. 163
161

“We will not permit the BIA to use either its own or the State Department’s
conjecture to deem a person not credible. ‘Because conjecture is not a substitute for
substantial evidence, we cannot uphold this finding.’” Shah v. INS, 220 F.3d 1062,
1069 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Lopez-Reyes v. INS, 79 F.3d 908, 912 (9th Cir. 1996)).
162
“The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for the consideration of
asylum applications filed under subsection (a).” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(1) (2005).
163
In Djouma v. Gonzales the Seventh Circuit noted:
We understand the dilemma facing immigration judges in asylum
cases. The applicant for asylum normally bases his claim almost
entirely on his own testimony, and it is extremely difficult for the
judge to determine whether the testimony is accurate. Often it is
given through a translator, and even if the applicant testifies in
English, as a foreigner his demeanor will be difficult for the
immigration judge to “read” as an aid to determining the
applicant’s credibility. Unfortunately, the [DHS] and the [DOJ],
which share responsibility for processing asylum claims, have, so
far as appears, failed to provide the immigration judges and the
members of the [BIA] with any systematic guidance on the
resolution of credibility issues in these cases. The departments
have not conducted studies of patterns of true and false
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The lack of a clearly defined protocol thus leads to uncertainty in the
adjudicative process for prospective alien applicants, 164 which in turn
may force an alien to file for as many forms of relief as possible given
that he or she may be unable to determine the merits of a particular
claim of relief. This adds additional adjudications to already
overcrowded immigration court dockets, thus compounding and
contributing to the problems already exposed within the system. In an
effort to relieve the burden of overcrowded immigration dockets, the
DOJ recently undertook a major procedure renovation addressed
below. However, the DOJ and DHS have to date failed to incorporate
Seventh Circuit recommendations on improving the asylum
adjudication system such as those outlined in Djouma, in which the
Court suggested the need for a more clearly delineated protocol to be
utilized in investigating cultural phenomena and characteristics
representations made by such applicants, of sources of
corroboration and refutation, or of the actual consequences to
asylum applicants who are denied asylum and removed to the
country that they claim will persecute them. Without such
systematic evidence (which the State Department’s country reports
on human rights violations, though useful, do not provide),
immigration judges are likely to continue grasping at straws-minor contradictions that prove nothing, absence of documents that
may in fact be unavailable in the applicant’s country or to an
asylum applicant, and patterns of behavior that would indeed be
anomalous in the conditions prevailing in the United States but
may not be in Third World countries--in an effort to avoid giving
all asylum applicants a free pass. The departments seem
committed to case by case adjudication in circumstances in which
a lack of background knowledge denies the adjudicators the
cultural competence required to make reliable determinations of
credibility.
429 F.3d 685, 687-88 (7th Cir. 2005).
164
“There are significant variations in the rate at which immigration judges
grant asylum - from court to court, and from judge to judge within the same court requiring better quality assurance and administrative review.” Human Rights First,
New Report From U.S. Religious Freedom Commission Exposes Barriers Facing
Refugees (February 8, 2005),
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/2005_alerts/asy_0208_relig.htm (last visited
Apr. 26, 2006).
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pertinent to asylum applicant countries as well as the need for followup assessments on the actual consequences of asylum applicants who
have been returned to their respective countries subsequent to asylum
denials. 165
B. The Fateful Decision to Streamline
In 2002, then acting Attorney General John Ashcroft finalized the
implementation of a ‘streamlining’ procedure into BIA protocol. 166
According to the DOJ, the regulations promulgated under the
streamlining amendments were “designed to address extensive
backlogs and lengthy delays . . . [t]he new procedures enabled the BIA
to reduce delays in the administrative review process, eliminate the
existing backlog of cases, and focus more attention and resources on
those cases presenting significant issues for resolution.” 167
Under the modified procedures a single member of the BIA will
initially review an appealed IJ asylum decision in order to determine if
a three-member panel should review the decision.168 If review is
warranted, a panel shall review the decision and may then reverse the
IJ decision, affirm the decision without opinion, or the panel may
affirm the decision with an amended or new opinion. 169 The single
Board member who initially reviews the IJ decision may also affirm
the lower opinion without review if that Board member believes it was
correctly decided, although the regulations make clear that this “does
not necessarily imply approval of all of the reasoning of that decision,
but does signify the Board’s conclusion that any errors in the decision
of the immigration judge or the Service were harmless or
165

See Djouma, 429 F.3d at 687-88.
See U.S. Department of Justice: Executive Office for Immigration Review,
BIA Restructuring and Streamlining Procedures, (Dec. 8, 2004 revised), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/04/BIAStreamlining120804.pdf (last visited Apr.
26, 2006).
167
Id.
168
See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4) (2005).
169
See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2005); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2005).
166
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nonmaterial.” 170 In addition, the streamlining regulation decreased the
number of Board members from 23 to 11 in number. 171
Critics quickly responded to the new regulations by challenging
their constitutionality concerning due process of law in federal courts,
although each federal circuit court has held that the restructuring
regulation is valid and does not violate due process standards. 172
Despite these setbacks, opponents of the new regulations have
continued to voice their concerns and much of their criticism possesses
validity which may yet force the DOJ to critically analyze the merits
of the new streamlining procedure. 173
Initially, the decision to reduce the number of BIA members has
been criticized as political in nature. Several critics believe that the
Attorney General simply removed the Board members most likely to
disagree with his position on immigration issues and that this, in turn,
undermined the independence of the remaining Board members. 174
170

8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4)(ii) (2005).
Id. at § 1003.1(a).
172
U.S. Department of Justice: Executive Office for Immigration Review, BIA
Restructuring and Streamlining Procedures, (Dec. 8, 2004 revised), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/04/BIAStreamlining120804.pdf (last visited Apr.
26, 2006) (noting that federal circuit courts have denied challenges to the
streamlining regulation). The Seventh Circuit has passed on the issue of whether
streamlining is constitutional, that is, whether due process is denied to an alien when
a single Board member affirms a denial as opposed to a BIA panel. See Hamdan v.
Gonzales, 425 F.3d 1051, 1057-58 (7th Cir. 2005). It was unnecessary to determine
this issue since an affirmance without opinion of an IJ’s decision issued by a single
Board member becomes the final decision of the BIA, and the Court reviews all final
BIA asylum decisions under the same standard of review. Id. at 1058.
173
See John R.B. Palmer, Stephen W. Yale-Loehr & Elizabeth Cronin, Why
Are So Many People Challenging Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions in
Federal Court? An Empirical Analysis of the Recent Surge in Petitions for Review,
20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 29-30 (2005) (noting “[a]part from legal challenges,
however, criticism of the procedural changes continues to be voiced loudly by
lawyers, scholars, members of Congress, and even by IJs and a former Board
member.”).
174
John R. B. Palmer, The Immigration Surge in the Federal Courts of
Appeals, 11-2 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 2 (2006) (citing see Stephen H. Legomsky,
Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 369 (2006); Peter J.
171
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This position is supported by DOJ supplemental language
accompanying the regulation which purports that uniformity in
decisions was a goal of the new regulation. 175 It stands to reason that
this uniformity does not favor the positions brought by alien asylum
applicants. 176 Yet, the unintended, or perhaps implicitly intended,
effect of the streamlining procedure has been a stark increase in the
number of BIA decisions appealed to the federal courts. 177 While the
dockets of the BIA have decreased under the new regulations, 178 the
number of petitions filed with the federal courts has sharply
increased. 179 “The rate of new petitions – the number of BIA
decisions appealed to the Federal courts compared to the total number
of BIA decisions – has increased from an [sic] historical 5 percent
(before 2002) to a current [December 8, 2004] level of approximately
25 percent.” 180 The result of the streamlining procedure has simply
Levinson, The Facade of Quasi-Judicial Independence in Immigration Appellate
Adjudications, 9 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 1154 (2004)).
175
John R. B. Palmer, The Immigration Surge in the Federal Courts of
Appeals, 11-2 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 2 (2006) (citing Board of Immigration
Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878,
54,894 (Aug. 26, 2002)).
176
“In endorsing the removal of [the 12 Board members removed under the
regulations], the Executive Director of the Center for Immigration Studies, which
advocates significant restrictions on immigration, observed that ‘Board members
should clearly represent the attorney general’s views, since they are carrying out his
responsibility.’” Andrew I. Schoenholtz, Refugee Protection in the United States
Post-September 11, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 323, 357 (2005) (citing Ricardo
Alonso-Zaldivar & Jonathan Peterson, 5 on Immigration Board Asked to Leave;
Critics Call It a ‘Purge’, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2003, at A16.).
177
U.S. Department of Justice: Executive Office for Immigration Review, BIA
Restructuring and Streamlining Procedures, (Dec. 8, 2004 revised), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/04/BIAStreamlining120804.pdf (last visited Apr.
26, 2006).
178
Id. (noting “[t]he expanded streamlining procedures have allowed the BIA
to allocate its limited resources to adjudicate more than 40,000 new appeals and
other matters filed annually, and to steadily reduce its pending caseload from 56,000
in August 2002 to approximately 33,000 by October 2004.”).
179
Id.
180
Id.
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been the transfer of meaningful appeals on the merits from the BIA to
the federal courts.
It seems the streamlining procedure allows the BIA to probe less
thoroughly into the merits of an asylum case and the corresponding IJ
opinion. Indeed, the streamlining regulations have largely eliminated
the BIA’s de novo review of factual issues “by establishing ‘the
primacy of the immigration judges as factfinders’ and requiring the
Board to defer to the Immigration Judge unless a decision is ‘clearly
erroneous.’” 181 Further, the affirmance without opinion portion of the
regulations allows a single Board member to affirm even if there are
harmless or nonmaterial errors within that opinion. 182 Given the large
number of appeals filed with the BIA, there may be an inherent
temptation to characterize flaws in the analysis of an immigration
judge as harmless in an effort to reduce the number of docketed cases
at both the IJ and BIA level. In addition, the removal of immigration
judges who represent a broader ideological and cultural base may strip
the BIA of the benefits of more rigorous judicial debate. Thus, the
reduction of the number of BIA members, coupled with the
streamlining system, may seriously hamper the “filtering process”
which the BIA as an appellate entity represents. 183 Therefore,
erroneous IJ decisions that would normally have been reversed and
remedied by the BIA now slip through to the Seventh Circuit and other
federal courts where these opinions garner heavy criticism. 184
181

Schoenholtz, supra note 176, at 355 (citing Board of Immigration Appeals:
Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,881
(Aug. 26, 2002)).
182
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4)(ii) (2005).
183
Although, as the Seventh Circuit has noted, this may not ultimately
prejudice an asylum applicant since meaningful review will be provided on some
level. See Hamdan v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 1051, 1058 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Georgis
v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 962, 967 (7th Cir. 2003). Yet, asylum applicants (1) must pay
additional court filing fees if forced to appeal to federal circuit courts, (2) must wait
additional time periods for resolution of their claims in the federal circuit courts, and
(3) undoubtedly would benefit from the full application of DOJ-sponsored BIA
review prior to entering the federal circuit court arena.
184
See Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005).
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The DOJ disagrees with these conclusions, instead attributing the
rise in the number of federal court appeals to an increased processing
time for appeals and motions within the BIA, which then prompts an
alien to appeal an adverse decision in order to stave off deportation as
long as possible. 185 However, this seems a rather simplistic and illsupported explanation, as aliens have long resorted to appeals as a
means of delaying an inevitable deportation and there would thus be
no reason for a sustained spike in the number of federal appeals.
Rather, more plausible explanations would be a drop in the quality of
IJ analysis, a less probing BIA, and a decrease in the physical number
and ideological diversity of BIA members. These explanations are
supported by the high rate of reversal in immigration appeals noted by
the Seventh Circuit. 186
It is evident that the problem here is the procedural design
implemented by the DOJ. What then can be done to remedy the
effects of the streamlining process? The most obvious answer would
be to restore or increase the number of BIA members reviewing
immigration appeals. This would allow the BIA to again provide
meaningful review of IJ decisions and thus alleviate the burdens
placed on the federal courts. Since aliens are often required to exhaust
their administrative options before proceeding to federal court, those
options should at least have some teeth in their review. 187 In addition,
restoring meaningful BIA review would spare the DHS and the DOJ
from the national exposure and embarrassment that accompany those
IJ opinions that draw public ire and the wrath of the federal courts.
Alternatively, the elimination of the affirmance without opinion
provision may force the BIA to delve more thoroughly into the merits
of the decision it reviews. By forcing the BIA to address the analysis
of IJ decisions, the BIA may think twice about the rationality of the
conclusions contained therein.
185

U.S. Department of Justice: Executive Office for Immigration Review, BIA
Restructuring and Streamlining Procedures, (Dec. 8, 2004 revised), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/04/BIAStreamlining120804.pdf (last visited Apr.
26, 2006).
186
See Benslimane, 430 F.3d at 829.
187
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (2005).
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Although the Seventh Circuit has acknowledged the
constitutionality of the streamlining procedures, 188 the high rate of
reversals issued in the Court’s last term indicate that the Seventh
Circuit is forced to suffer the adverse effects of these procedures. The
Seventh Circuit often provides the first meaningful substantive review
of asylum denials and is therefore forced to confront problems
concerning credibility and corroboration, those rampant in the Court’s
recent opinions, head on. The streamlining procedures thus
compound, and possibly create, several of the prime errors upon which
many of the Seventh Circuit’s reversals are based. To this end,
eliminating the streamlining procedures will aid in alleviating the high
rate of asylum adjudication reversals issued by the Seventh Circuit.
C. Is the Immigration Judiciary Too Homogeneous?
Another problem inherent in the immigration system could be a
lack of diversity amongst immigration judges. Does the court lack
enough diversity to properly address cultural diversity? Or is that just
a red herring? Attorneys and legal scholars have attributed some of
the inappropriate decisions and behavior exhibited by IJs to racial or
ethnic bias and a lack of cultural sensitivity. 189 A recent Los Angeles
Times article, citing government records, noted that “of the 224
immigration judges in the U.S., 166 are white, 26 African American,
22 Latino, nine Asian and one Native American.” 190
It would be thoroughly discouraging to imply that a lack of racial
or ethnic diversity as an explanation for subpar immigration judge
analysis warrants merit, as these individuals are fully licensed legal
practitioners and adjudicators charged with interpreting and applying
the laws of the U.S. 191 If it were to be assumed that the racial or
ethnic biases of our immigration judges were impeding a fair
188

See Georgis v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 962, 966-67 (7th Cir. 2003).
Ann M. Simmons, Some Immigrants Meet Harsh Face of Justice, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 12, 2006, at A18.
190
Id.
191
8 C.F.R. § 1.1(l) (2003).
189
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application of our immigration laws, the entire legacy of the open arms
of the U.S. would be lost. Yet, it still remains a distinct possibility for
error and one that would be extremely difficult to verify or
substantiate.
Furthermore, an expansion of races and ethnicities in the
immigration courts and BIA would not necessarily translate to an
expanded cultural base. Several of the problems discussed in this
Comment stem from American cultural context as a whole, which is
comprised on nearly every ethnic background. 192 Thus, adding more
ethnicities pulled from a generalized (at least in theory) American
cultural existence would not necessarily provide a much more diverse
cultural context, thus not providing a more evenhanded and acute
application of our immigration laws.
Moreover, it is highly doubtful that the DOJ would be able to
recruit or obtain a meaningful number of United States citizen
attorneys haling natively from foreign countries in order to represent a
broader cultural base within our immigration judiciary. Nor could we
assume that an immigration judge born, raised, or culturally steeped in
a foreign country would not then simply apply that judge’s own
cultural context, thus favoring or disfavoring certain aliens depending
upon that foreign country’s cultural tendencies.
This does give rise to an interesting possibility though. Should
the government attempt to regionalize the geographic or cultural areas
in which certain IJs practice? That is to say, should immigration
judges be charged with adjudicating asylum applications for a limited
and prescribed number of countries? Presumably, an IJ charged solely
with adjudicating asylum claims (without reference to the adjudication
of non-asylum claims) from a geographic region such as the South
Pacific would be able to familiarize himself of herself more
thoroughly with the current political and social conditions, the cultural
backgrounds of people native to the countries in that area, and perhaps
even the languages to some extent. This would likely have a profound
effect on the accuracy of credibility determinations and demeanor
interpretations, and may offer valuable insight to immigration
192

See supra Parts III.A.1-2.
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adjudicators on when and where they should reasonably expect
corroborating documentation.
Yet there are problems in this scenario as well. Governments rise
and fall and wars come and go. At any one point in history,
disproportionate numbers of refugees seek asylum from different
corners of the world. 193 Conflicts today may generate a large number
of refugees from a certain country that might stabilize and produce no
refugees in the near future. If the United States Government were to
focus asylum adjudications by region with correspondingly specialized
IJs, it is plausible that at certain periods many IJs will have no asylum
applications on their dockets while others are overwhelmed with an
influx of applications from one geographic area. Moreover, venue
would pose a problem in this scenario too. Often refugees and asylum
applicants have little or no money upon entering the United States. It
would be impracticable and unreasonable to require an applicant to
travel across the country in order to have his or her application
adjudicated by a specialized IJ. Yet, this problem could possibly be
remedied by simply creating specialized immigration judges within
each DOJ Immigration Court. 194 Therefore, despite the procedural
difficulties inherent with the implementation of geographically
regionalized immigration judges, the benefits afforded by this concept
may be worth contemplating its realization in the future.
Although the racial and ethnic constituency of the immigration
court is not a beacon of diversity, it is not entirely homogeneous

193

See Department of State - Department of Homeland Security - Department
of Health and Human Services, Report to Congress: Proposed Refugee Admissions
for Fiscal Year 2005, available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/36228.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2006).
194
As of April, 2006, there were 51 U.S. DOJ Immigration Courts located
throughout the following States: Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Washington. United States Department of
Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/sibpages/ICadr.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2006).
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either. 195 Broad racial divisions such as white, black, and Asian may
encompass literally hundreds of different ethnicities and cultures.
However, increased diversity is always a goal to strive towards. Yet a
system in which immigration adjudicators remain mindful of the
myriad variety of cultural and ethnic backgrounds in the claims before
them is a system that can be successful in an evenhanded and fair
application of our immigration laws.
The problematic areas of streamlining, guidance to immigration
judges, and diversity amongst immigration adjudicators all represent
procedural policies, both explicit and implicit, of the DOJ. 196
However, all of these problems could be remedied without a serious
restructuring of the existing adjudicatory process. The recent
streamlining regulations can be repealed, thus reforming a larger and
more diverse BIA, which reviews all IJ decisions by panel with an
accompanying opinion. More comprehensive guides and regulations
concerning credibility determinations and other subjective analysis can
be enacted and a concerted effort can be made to broaden the racial
and ethnic composition of the immigration judge pool. Although the
Seventh Circuit has not specifically addressed these procedural policy
issues, the role of the judiciary is not to critique the policy reasons that
may form the basis for common immigration adjudication errors, 197
but simply to correct those errors that come before the courts. Yet, the
Seventh Circuit may ultimately prompt the DOJ to take the Court’s
considerations into account through the use of systematic, but valid,
reversals. 198
V. IS THE PROBLEM REALLY AS BAD AS IT SEEMS?
195

Ann M. Simmons, Some Immigrants Meet Harsh Face of Justice, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 12, 2006, at A18.
196
See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2005) (concerning streamlining procedure and the
appointment of BIA Board Members by the Attorney General); 8 U.S.C. §
1158(d)(1) (2005) (concerning adjudication procedures set down by the Attorney
General).
197
Although it seems the Seventh Circuit has taken certain liberties with this
principle. See Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829-30 (7th Cir. 2005).
198
Id.
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Many of the problems identified by the Seventh Circuit during its
last term are acknowledged by federal circuit courts across the
nation. 199 The Seventh Circuit’s opinions provide examples of how
these problems, those such as cultural bias and skepticism, manifest
themselves in asylum cases. 200 At the same time the Court’s opinions
are often indicative of the manner in which it believes these problems
should be remedied. 201 A majority of the problems discussed in this
Comment are touched upon, whether expressly or implicitly, by recent
Seventh Circuit decisions and thus are problems that play a large part
in the asylum adjudication process. 202 Yet, the Seventh Circuit as a
court of law is bound by the application of the appropriate standards of
review and reverses cases only when the law dictates they must.
However, the Court can attempt to shift the policies of immigration
adjudication through persistent reversal and biting language; at least to
the extent that proper application of the law allows. But to what extent
can the Seventh Circuit actually begin to change immigration policy?
Certainly the Court has the ability to interpret the meaning of statutes
and regulations that Congress, the DHS, and the DOJ promulgate. 203
But can the Seventh Circuit provide the impetus for a policy shift?
As noted, between June 15, 2005 and December 15, 2005, the
Seventh Circuit granted a petition to review or reversed the decision of
the BIA in nearly two-thirds of its published decisions. 204 This high
rate of reversal is certainly discomforting and has obtained the
attention of the government and the general public as will be discussed
below. Yet, could this simply be a strategy contrived by the Seventh
Circuit and other federal circuit courts designed to provide change?
199

See id. at 829.
See, e.g., Tabaku v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 417 (7th Cir. 2005); Dong v.
Gonzales, 421 F.3d 573 (7th Cir. 2005).
201
See generally Tabaku, 425 F.3d 417; Dong, 421 F.3d 573.
202
See, e.g., Lhanzom v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 2005); Zen Li Iao v.
Gonzales, 400 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 2005).
203
See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1966).
204
See supra note 6.
200
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There exists a school of thought on “selective publishing” in which
courts choose to publish only those opinions that further preordained
goals. 205 Judges exercise considerable discretion, even under a court’s
publication guidelines, in deciding which opinions should be prepared
or published, and thus, which decisions become laws. 206 Although it
may take a concerted effort from several judges, it is entirely plausible
that this strategy could be utilized to draw attention to, and instigate
reform in, certain problematic areas of law.
For example, note the high rate of reversal in recent asylum
opinions published by the Seventh Circuit. 207 However, during the
contemporaneous period in unpublished decisions the Seventh Circuit
denied petitions for review in 22 out of 24 appeals; results nearly polar
opposite those of the published opinions. 208 This represents an
astounding contrast.

205

See Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if They
Publish? Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial
Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 AM. U.L. REV. 757, 785-90 (1995).
206
See id at 790.
207
See supra note 6.
208
Cases in which the petition was granted: Kiggundu v. Gonzales, 151 Fed.
App’x 481 (7th Cir. 2005); Huang v. Gonzales, 139 Fed. App’x 753 (7th Cir. 2005).
Cases in which the petition was denied: Miron v. Gonzales, 159 Fed. App’x
731 (7th Cir. 2005); Siqeca v. Gonzales, 157 Fed. App’x 912 (7th Cir. 2005);
Zagorcani v. Gonzales, 145 Fed. App’x 184 (7th Cir. 2005); Feto v. Gonzales, 148
Fed. App’x 559 (7th Cir. 2005); Zheng v. Gonzales, 155 Fed. App’x 913 (7th Cir.
2005); Weng v. Gonzales, 155 Fed. App’x 927 (7th Cir. 2005); Ponomareva v.
Gonzales, 156 Fed. App’x 845 (7th Cir. 2005); Zheng v. Gonzales, 156 Fed. App’x
830 (7th Cir. 2005); Zhang v. Gonzales, 154 Fed. App’x 520 (7th Cir. 2005); Chen
v. Gonzales, 152 Fed. App’x 528 (7th Cir. 2005); Tchoukreeva v. Gonzales, 150
Fed. App’x 570 (7th Cir. 2005); Agraja v. Gonzales, 152 Fed. App’x 524 (7th Cir.
2005); Bah v. Gonzales, 143 Fed. App’x 709 (7th Cir. 2005); Caushi v. Gonzales,
147 Fed. App’x 603 (7th Cir. 2005); Loli v. Gonzales, 147 Fed. App’x 598 (7th Cir.
2005); Lin v. Gonzales, 140 Fed. App’x 621 (7th Cir. 2005); Malik v. Gonzales, 137
Fed. App’x 916 (7th Cir. 2005); Li v. Gonzales, 135 Fed. App’x 881 (7th Cir. 2005);
Zhang v. Gonzales, 136 Fed. App’x 930 (7th Cir. 2005); Ni v. Gonzales, 134 Fed.
App’x 977 (7th Cir. 2005); Stermolli v. Gonzales, 134 Fed. App’x 970 (7th Cir.
2005); Kebe v. Gonzales, 134 Fed. App’x 966 (7th Cir. 2005).
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Perhaps the Seventh Circuit became tired of wading through
irrational immigration decisions. Perhaps the Court responded to the
transplantation of the BIA’s docket to its own. 209 Or perhaps this is
solely coincidence and there is no agenda or implicit meaning behind
the numbers. It is true that the period reviewed for this Comment
represents only a six-month window of Seventh Circuit decisions. Yet,
the striking disparity between the reversal rates in published versus
unpublished opinions, coupled with the Seventh Circuit’s biting
criticism in the published opinions seems to convey a stern message to
the DHS and the DOJ that this system needs to be remedied. To that
end, it appears that the message has been received.
VI. CHANGE IS IN THE AIR
In recent opinions the Seventh Circuit and the federal circuit
courts of appeals have demonstrated a rising impatience with
immigration judges and the BIA’s pattern of serious misapplication of
elementary adjudication principles in asylum cases. 210 It appears that
these opinions have not fallen on deaf ears. A front-page column on
the New York Times’ December 26, 2005 issue bore the headline
“Courts Criticize Judges’ Handling of Asylum Cases.” 211 The article
addresses the sharp criticism levied on immigration judges from
federal circuit courts across the nation while quoting language from
the recent Seventh Circuit decision Zen Li Iao v. Gonzales. 212 The
209
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26, 2006).
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TIMES, Dec. 26, 2005, at A1.
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Id. (quoting Zen Li Iao v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 530, 533-35 (7th Cir. 2005),
immigration judges’ “lack of familiarity with relevant foreign cultures” was
“disturbing,” and the BIA often affirmed “either with no opinion or with a very
short, unhelpful, boilerplate opinion even when” the immigration judge had
committed “manifest errors of fact and logic.”).
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article notes that the gravity of these statements is amplified by their
issuance from courts known for their “temperate language.”213 It
further cites to recent immigration opinions issued by several circuit
court judges which address the inadequacy of the current situation and
suggest that more thorough review be reinstated at the BIA level. 214
DOJ officials respond and caution against drawing conclusions,
denying that a serious problem exists. They note that nearly 300,000
matters are handled by IJs yearly and the negative opinions cited
represent a small minority of decisions issued. 215 Yet, despite the
disparity in positions between these entities it appears the United
States Government has taken stock.
On January 9, 2006, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales issued a
Memorandum to Immigration Judges and a Memorandum to the Board
of Immigration Appeals that appear to have been prompted by recent
federal circuit court decisions and the accompanying public outcry.216
In both memoranda Gonzales stated that he “has watched with concern
the reports of immigration judges who fail to treat aliens appearing
before them with appropriate respect and consideration and who fail to
produce the quality of work that I expect from employees of the
Department of Justice.” 217 According to these memoranda the Deputy
Attorney General and Associate Attorney General have been instructed
to develop a comprehensive review of the immigration courts,
including the quality of work and procedural manners of both
immigration judges and the BIA. 218 Gonzales concluded the
213
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216
Human Rights First, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales: Memorandum to
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memoranda by noting that while not all aliens will be entitled to the
relief they seek, they are entitled to courtesy and respect from “the
face of American justice.” 219
The Seventh Circuit and the federal circuit courts of appeals
should view the issuance of these memoranda as a success. The
Seventh Circuit stood its ground in a rising tide of immigration
adjudication incompetence through the use of both a high, yet
validated, level of reversals and harsh criticism designed to underscore
the prevalent problems hindering proper adjudication. 220 These
problems appear to be based in part on erroneous subjective analyses
performed by immigration judges and the BIA. 221 Yet, under the
newly enacted provisions of the REAL ID Act of 2005, it appears
these problems may only become amplified and endorsed by the DOJ
and the DHS. 222 Therefore, in order for the critiques of the Seventh
Circuit to truly remedy the problems identified, the DOJ must
scrutinize the possible ramifications these new provisions may bring
when applied by the current immigration adjudicatory bodies.
CONCLUSION
It is evident that the asylum adjudicatory process administered by
the immigration courts and the BIA remains flawed. Recurring and
widespread errors manifest themselves throughout the asylum
application process, often resulting in unjust asylum denials. The
Seventh Circuit has consistently demonstrated its concern with the
quality of adjudicatory analysis conducted by the DHS and the
DOJ, 223 noting, “the adjudication of these cases at the administrative
219
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See, e.g., Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005); See
generally Tabaku v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 417 (7th Cir. 2005); Soumahoro v.
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2005).
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level has fallen below the minimum standards of legal justice.” 224
Although the identification of recurring errors is a step in the right
direction, it may be difficult to remedy the system given that these
errors represent both procedural flaws such as streamlining and a lack
of proper DOJ guidance, as well as flaws inherent to immigration
adjudicators themselves such as cultural indifference, bias, and
impartial subjective claim analysis. 225
However, in its recognition of fundamental flaws within the
immigration adjudication context, the Seventh Circuit has made clear
which entities it believes can begin remedying this situation:
[w]hether [the unacceptable quality of adjudication] is
due to resource constraints or to other circumstances
beyond the Board’s and the Immigration Court’s
control, we do not know, though we note that the
problem is not of recent origin . . . [a]ll that is clear is
that it cannot be in the interest of the immigration
authorities, the taxpayer, the federal judiciary, or
citizens concerned with the effective enforcement of the
nation’s immigration laws for removal orders to be
routinely nullified by the courts, and that the power of
correction lies in the [DHS], which prosecutes removal
cases, and the [DOJ], which adjudicates them in its
Immigration Court and [BIA]. 226
The Seventh Circuit correctly recognized the existence of
fundamental problems in the current status of asylum adjudications,
and immigration adjudications as a whole. The Court has also
correctly taken a firm stance concerning the problems identified,
reversing immigration judge and BIA decisions at a disproportionately

224

Id. at 829-30 (citing Niam v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 652, 654 (7th Cir. 2004)).
See supra Part III.A.2.
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high rate. 227 The number of reversals and the harsh criticisms leveled
on immigration adjudicators within these reversals appears designed to
bring these issues to the attention of those capable of addressing them;
to wit: the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of
Justice.
In addition, the Seventh Circuit has provided express and implicit
remedies for many of the problems identified throughout its opinions,
although the Court is limited in its ability to dole out unsolicited
advice as an impartial judiciary. However, it initially appears the
Seventh Circuit’s suggestions were not given due credence as recent
legislative enactments such as the REAL ID Act of 2005 may serve to
actually exacerbate many of the common problems recognized by the
Court as opposed to remedying them. 228 Nevertheless, the Seventh
Circuit may yet induce positive changes within the immigration
adjudication system given Attorney General Alberto Gonzales’ recent
announcement of a comprehensive review concerning the consistent
failings and incompetence of immigration adjudicators. 229 Perhaps
this review may ultimately result in the application of principles the
Seventh Circuit has long espoused through its opinions, although only
time will tell. However, until the DHS and the DOJ actually take
proactive and concrete steps to address the problems identified by the
Seventh Circuit, the Court may be forced to continue reversing poorly
adjudicated administrative asylum decisions at a disproportionately
high rate.
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